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and “English law” were somehow coterminous for the purposes of its argument. There are
occasional footnote references to devolution, but the book does not properly acknowledge
that telling the full story of the constitutional relationship between democracy and rights in
the United Kingdom is now considerably more complex than an account based exclusively on
English law will allow for.
Adam Tomkins
University of Glasgow
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CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 2008, vol 61. Ed by Colm O’Cinneide and Jane
Holder
Oxford: Oxford University Press (www.oup.com), 2009. xxv + 423 pp. ISBN 9780199545513.
£89.95.
The 61st volume of Current Legal Problems offers the usual eclectic mix of issues, current
controversies and theoretical puzzles drawn from diverse legal fields, thereby presenting a
particular challenge to the reviewer attempting to do justice in a brief review to the depth
of scholarship and nuance of argument in this fine collection. Notwithstanding such diversity,
the theme of constitutionalism, sometimes salient, sometimes latent, provides a common point
of reference for the content of the chapters.
Questions of constitutional democracy and constitutional ideology animate Danny Nicol’s
rather intemperate critique of what he calls “Britain’s [sic] Transnational Constitution”.
Tracing the development and effects in the UK of the various post-state legal regimes which
have sprung up in the post-war era, Nicol harbours a particular ire for three: the EU,
Council of Europe and WTO. Not only are these causing the strangulation of democracy
in the UK, but they are also, according to Nicol, imposing a neo-liberal straitjacket on
what was apparently a halcyon era of Westminster parliamentary democracy. The problem
with denouncing one’s international obligations and lauding the superiority of one’s domestic
constitutional arrangements is that it is usually the preserve of corrupt dictators and wayward
US presidents. While I am sure that Nicol falls into neither of these categories, he finds
himself in rather strange company in his attack on the domestic impact of these transnational
regimes. The evidence presented to support the charge of ideological imperialism is both
selective and tendentious – a whole raft of EU social protection measures are studiously
ignored in the pursuit of polemic, and the putative neo-liberal agenda of the ECHR seems
to hinge entirely on the fact that the Convention contains a protocol protecting property
rights. Nicol is on firmer ground with respect to the charge of democratic devaluation, and
indeed the challenges of globalisation and the preservation of democracy are one of the most
profound puzzles for political and constitutional theory in the twenty-first century. However, his
parochial eulogisation of theWestminster Parliamentary system as paradigmatic of accountable
democracy is, when viewed in the light of recent scandals, naive and, when likened to a
Tullyesque ideal of agonistic democracy, fatuous.
A slightly more sanguine view of the effects of transnational regulation on the UK’s
constitutional system is offered by contributions from Bob Hepple and Diamond Ashiagabor
which highlight (although not always directly) the fact that a large part of the regulation
of equality and non-discrimination in the UK emerges from Europe. Hepple provides an
insightful and exhaustive chronicle of the development of UK equality legislation from 1965
to the present day while Ashiagabor addresses the anti-discrimination side of the equality coin,
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deftly highlighting the difficulties in reconciling rigid binary legal categories with the fluid
nature of identity politics in the context of sex and race discrimination.
In his chapter on prophylactic legislation, Michael Dorf questions how legislation which
“overreaches”, causing harm to individuals to which the reasons underpinning the legislation
do not apply, can be morally justified from the victim’s viewpoint. Starting from relatively minor
cases such as the skilled driver (immorally) constrained by speed limits, Dorf goes on to bring
this analysis to bear on more pressing contemporary controversies involving euthanasia and
torture. Thus, asks Dorf, how can a law prohibiting euthanasia be morally justifiable from the
viewpoint of the compos mentis, intelligent, independent and capable terminally-ill patient to
whom the main justifications of the prohibition (e.g. protection of vulnerable patients) do not
apply? Similarly, how can a prohibition on torture serve to justify the harm to potential terrorist
victims who, given their ethnicity, religion, education and social status, are unlikely to be
tortured themselves? The moral justification is, according to Dorf, lacking in respect for these
smaller groups due to the fact that the costs of the prophylactic measure outweigh the benefits
it is supposed to achieve. In the case of the patient, the costs of pain and suffering outweigh
the benefits of social protection of vulnerable patients; with the potential terrorist victim, the
costs of potential harm through terrorism outweigh the benefits of protection of vulnerable
groups from torture. The moral objections to prophylactic legislation need to be addressed in
the broader context of constitutional values, particularly those moral axioms codified in bills of
rights. In modern constitutional democracy, such values are authoritative in the functioning
of politics, reflecting the fundamental values of the political community. As such, whereas
Dorf’s transposition of this question to new pastures such as euthanasia and terrorism is novel,
from a constitutional viewpoint his methodology is questionable. Dorf deliberately brackets
deontological objections to euthanasia and torture, yet it is precisely the force of deontological
arguments against such practices which makes their prohibition absolute, and justifies their
status as the constitutive values of a political community. Political communities, and the values
they espouse through their constitutionalisation, cannot be morally relativist if they are to be
internally coherent. Assessing moral absolutes in terms of costs and benefits is a negation of the
idea of the authority of constitutional values and the rule of law itself, a point clearly illustrated
by Ronald Dworkin through the notion of checkerboard legislating.
Jörg Fedtke, Richard Rawlings and Philip Rawlings, in their respective contributions,
trace other aspects of constitutionalism in both domestic and foreign settings. Fedtke,
taking a resolutely comparative constitutionalist approach, considers the successes and
failures of constitutional transplants from German constitutional law into the post-Apartheid
South African constitutional landscape, finding that on balance they have not been
particularly successful, although more sustained analysis of precisely why Germany was
a good comparator with South Africa may have further enlightened the reader as to
what makes a good constitutional transplant and why, in this case, the transplant was not
successful. Richard Rawlings’ contribution remains within one of the more classic domains
of constitutionalism – judicial review and the separation of powers. He provides a sustained
analysis of the development of judicial review jurisdiction in England and Wales in the past
twenty years or so and traces how it is increasingly being broadened from a rigid “drainpipe”
model to a more complex “spaghetti junction” model, caused in no small part by Fedkte-like
constitutional – if not quite “transplants”, then – influences, primarily of the US persuasion, as
well as aspects of Nicol’s malignant transnational constitution – primarily EU and ECHR law.
Philip Rawlings, in an intriguing and topical chapter, explores UK constitutional history by
tracing the origins of the regulation of stockbrokers in the heady days of Revolutionary London
and the influence of the nascent financial services industry on the configuration of power during
and after the Revolutionary settlement. The ability to raise finance independently was key to
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this power distribution and was one of the central issues in Parliament’s struggle to wrest power
from the monarch. To a strapped monarch, the financial services industry provided a method
of raising finance which was particularly troubling to a Parliament engaged in attempting to
curb the powers of the king. Moreover, the growth of the finance industry caused a profound
social revolution which changed the rules regarding access to economic (and therefore political)
power and directly threatened vested interests, particularly the constitutional role of the landed
gentry which, Rawlings implies, motivated much of the animus to the stockbrokers of the era.
He ends the chapter with a salutary note on the creation of “folk devils” in times of crisis as a
form of abdication of personal responsibility, a thinly veiled reference to the demonisation of
so-called “banksters” by both the media and politicians in the aftermath of the “credit crunch”.
Gerry Simpson’s chapter touches upon some of the basic questions at the root of
constitutionalism, particularly the relationship between law and politics. A neat dichotomy
between law and politics is questionable at the national level. However, by his focus on the
crime of aggression in international law, Simpson illustrates that the issue is exacerbated with
respect to international law and politics. Notwithstanding its centrality to the international
criminal law regime, not least as the central justification for the Nuremberg and Tokyo
Tribunals, Simpson highlights that the development of the crime has been severely stunted
since the Second World War. He traces this lack of development (most strikingly in the Rome
Statute where the text of article 5 provides jurisdiction over the crime “once a provision
is adopted”) to the overtly political nature of such a crime as well as the impracticability
of enforcement. Questions of crime and punishment bring problems associated with the
constitutionalism of the international system into sharp relief given that such questions
presuppose a relatively “thick” and stable political community espousing common values.
The precise paucity of such elements at the international level which would contribute
to a depoliticised crime of aggression, combined with the practical and methodological
problems associated with the use of law as a tool to regulate a phenomenon as complex as
war entailing issues of causation and culpability, lead Simpson to conclude that a workable
definition of the crime is not on the horizon for the foreseeable future. For enthusiasts of
global constitutionalism based on international law, Simpson’s chapter gives ample pause for
thought.
The constitutionalisation of the international system is also a theme covered by Daniel Cole
in his discussion of the development of an international regime for dealing with climate change.
There is no question of “thick” notions of political community in this treatment, however, and
we return to rational-choice justifications of international rules: the resolution of collective
action problems amongst sovereign states. However, as Cole makes clear, each word of this
justification – collective, action and problem– is perhaps more heavily contested with respect
to climate change than any other area regulated by the international legal regime.
Constitutionalism in terms of process rights and questions of justice emerge specifically in
the context of criminal trials in the chapters by Jonathan Rogers andMike Redmayne, the latter
providing a sophisticated analysis of the complex moral issues raised in introducing character
evidence in criminal trials.
Notions of the “public” and the continued privatisation of the public sphere both by
the indigenous and transnational UK constitutions are present in the chapters by Dave
Cowan and Morag McDermott and the late Sir Hugh Laddie. Cowan and McDermott trace
the development in the politics of state housing provision from “public” to “social” where
the boundaries of public and private are increasingly blurred, a move which illustrates an
ambivalence in UK constitutional values as to the proper role of the state in the provision of
basic needs to its less well-off citizens. Laddie is concerned with the increasing privatisation of
the public domain through the proliferation of intellectual property rights, providing a series
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of (at times farcical) anecdotes to warn of the dangers of the over-privatisation of the public
sphere through IP.
The volume under review fully justifies the reputation of Current Legal Problems for high-
level legal scholarship and it is strongly recommended for anyone with an interest in erudite
and insightful approaches to contemporary legal debate.
Cormac Mac Amhlaigh
University of Edinburgh
EdinLR Vol 14 pp 160-161
DOI: 10.3366/E1364980909001115
Matthias Siems, CONVERGENCE IN SHAREHOLDER LAW
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (www.cambridge.org), 2008. 471 pp. ISBN
9780521876759. £75.
This book is presented in the context of two major and on-going debates in corporate law
scholarship. One is the effect of globalisation for convergence in corporate law and for
the de facto position of shareholders in companies. The other is the significance of legal
origin (especially as regards the influence of Common and Civil Law) for the trajectory of
development in corporate and capital markets law. In recent years some very broad claims have
beenmade in both debates. As far as convergence is concerned, it has been argued (echoing the
more general claim made by Francis Fukuyama in the early 1990s in The End of History and
the Last Man) that we have reached an end point in the development of corporate law in which
the (supposedly) superior qualities of the American model will lead to its worldwide hegemony.
As far as legal origin is concerned, the emergence (from a group of financial economists rather
than lawyers) in the late 1990s of the “law and finance” hypothesis of a strong link between
the Common Law and the development of shareholder rights and thence capital markets has
sparked an extensive debate in legal scholarship. Siems places both issues very much at the
centre of his analysis of convergence but formulates his approach so as to pay more attention
to the current state and process of convergence rather than to the more problematic issues
of causes and ultimate outcome. Instead of seeking support for “innovative” claims about
causality or ultimate outcome, Siems focuses much more on extrapolation from a systematic
examination of the underlying legal rules and the social and market context in which corporate
law operates. The outcome is a carefully argued and well-supported analysis of the present state
and likely future development of convergence in corporate law. There is, inevitably, a degree of
“debunking” of some of the (over-extended) earlier claims, but that comes across much more
as a by-product rather than as the motivating purpose of the book.
The book focuses on the law in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany,
Japan and China. The reference to “shareholder law” is taken to mean the rights and duties
of shareholders rather than the entire field of corporate law. The book is divided into four
parts with the objective of providing “diagnosis”, “prognosis” and “therapy”, following an
introductory part. In part II, “The status quo of convergence”, Siems adopts a perspective
that copes well with the complexity of the source material. He considers first the legal bases
or sources of convergence, taking into account the role of international and regional law, the
impact of capital markets law, the structure of the law as between mandatory and default
rules, and the impact of self-regulation. He then approaches the substantive rules through
the lens of a shareholder typology in which convergence is assessed by reference to the extent
